HMO Penetration, Ownership Status, and the Rise of Hospital Advertising by Jason R. Barro & Michael Chu
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HMO PENETRATION, OWNERSHIP STATUS,









We want to thank Martin Feldstein, Edward Glaeser, Fiona Scott Morten and all other participants at the
NBER Not-for-profit Organizations conferences for their helpful comments. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2002 by Jason R. Barro and Michael Chu.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.HMO Penetration, Ownership Status, and the Rise of Hospital Advertising
Jason R. Barro and Michael Chu
NBER Working Paper No. 8899
April 2002
JEL No. I1, L3, L1
ABSTRACT
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  Advertising is a pervasive component of many product markets in the United States, from 
soda to real estate to clothing.  Until recently, the providers of health care in America had been 
conspicuously absent in this activity.  In fact, for a great deal of the last century, advertising by 
physicians and hospitals was explicitly banned by their respective professional organizations.  In 
the American Medical Association’s first code of ethics, it was written that “[advertising is] 
highly reprehensible in a regular physician.”
1 
  Although still relatively small compared with other industries
2, advertising among 
hospitals has increased dramatically in recent years.  Figure 1 shows average advertising 
expenditures among hospitals in the United States from 1995-1998.  Of the roughly 5,000 acute 
care hospitals in the United States, 1,800 advertised in 1995.  Among those hospitals, the average 
advertising budget was $79,000.  By 1998, 2,500 hospitals advertised, and the average spending 
among those hospitals had increased by 56% in real dollars to $123,000 per hospital.
3  Over this 
same period, average hospital expenditures increased by only 10% in real terms.
4  Figure 2 
illustrates the increase in participation in advertising for hospitals over this time period.  Less than 
40% of hospitals advertised in 1995, compared with a little more than half by 1998. 
  Average advertising spending across all hospitals masks the most dramatic increase.  
Figure 3 breaks out the hospitals into five categories: not-for-profit teaching hospitals, other not-
for-profit hospitals, for-profit hospitals, religious hospitals, and public hospitals.  Figure 3 
illustrates that the true source of the overall advertising increase among American hospitals has 
been the not-for-profit teaching hospitals.  The spending levels in figure 3 are adjusted for bed 
size, so that any differences in ad spending due to differences in hospital size are removed.  The 
                                                           
1 American Medical Association, Original Code of Medical Ethics, 1847. 
2 Hospital advertising is, on average, .1-.2% of hospital revenues.  Other industries that are better known 
for their advertising have much larger advertising budgets.  Soda companies, for instance, spend 7-8% of 
revenues on advertising.  Car companies spend a little over 2%. (CompuStat) 
3 VoiceTrak survey of advertising 
  1average not-for-profit teaching hospital has increased its bed-adjusted ad expenditures by 140%.  
For-profit hospitals, however, have actually decreased their spending in real terms over this time. 
  In this paper, we examine the underlying cause of this rapid increase in advertising 
among hospitals.  We utilize a panel data set of hospital and market characteristics along with a 
unique data set of hospital advertising expenditures.  In the end, a critical component of the 
explanation is the rise of managed care across the country.  Those hospitals – and in particular the 
large, teaching hospitals – in markets that have experienced the greatest rise in managed care 
influence, had the most rapid increase in advertising. 
  The paper continues as follows.  The next section discusses the history of hospital 
advertising along with a discussion of the economics behind advertising for hospitals.  The third 
section presents various hypotheses as to why hospitals would have changed their advertising 
behavior at this time.  In the fourth section, we discuss the data.  The next to last section presents 
the empirical results, and the final section concludes. 
 
The History and Economics of Hospital Advertising 
  
One basic model of health care consumption in the United States involves patients 
depending on their physician as a well-informed, benevolent agent.  When a patient needs to 
receive treatment in a hospital, the physician suggests the course of treatment and the hospital in 
which it will be done.  Within this view of medical care, advertising direct to patients can play 
very little positive role, and may, in fact, be detrimental to patient outcomes. 
If the advertising signals lead the patient to disagree with the well-informed, benevolent 
physician, then the patient may seek alternative treatments.  This may positive if the physician 
was not fully informed, or if the physician was not truly acting in the patient’s best interest.  But 
if the physician was truly acting in the patient’s best interest, then the patient will only disagree 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 American Hospital Association, Annual Survey of Hospitals, 1995-1998. 
  2with the physician’s choices when the advertising is false and the patient is unable to determine 
its veracity.  This appears to have been the argument behind the restriction of advertising by 
hospitals and physicians for the bulk of the twentieth century. 
In 1847, when the AMA discussed advertising in its Code of Ethics, the concerns focused 
on exaggerated or outright fictitious claims perpetrated by some supposed healers. Until the late 
1970s, the American Medical Association (AMA), as well as the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) explicitly banned advertising for its members.  A successful Federal Trade Commission 
suit in 1980 made advertising a legal, if not accepted, part of medical care.  Prior to the final 
decision, the AHA had already decided to allow some regulated advertising for its member 
hospitals, as long as the “truthful” advertising was not done at the “expense of the competitor.” 
(Rosenstein 1985)  Even now the AMA is careful to remind its members that although there are 
no restrictions on advertising, there is a concern that the public will be easily “deceived” and that 
information transmitted to the public should done in a “readily comprehensible manner.”
5   
 
Not-for-Profit Hospitals and Advertising 
 
  Prior to the recent upsurge in advertising, not-for-profit hospitals historically engaged in 
less advertising than their for-profit counterparts.  Figure 3 shows that at the beginning of our 
sample in 1995, not-for-profits advertised less than for-profits, adjusting for the size of the 
hospital.  The anecdotal evidence, and the fact that the AMA and the AHA had so long banned 
the practice, suggests that not-for-profits had never relied on advertising in the hospital industry.  
The non-reliance on advertising among not-for-profit hospitals has several possible explanations. 
  A situation in which not-for-profits all choose to do little advertising requires some 
degree of collusion among the market participants.  Two facts about not-for-profit hospitals may 
help the hospitals collude not to advertise:  first, not-for-profits are typically thought to have more 
  3complicated objective functions than the typical profit-maximizing for-profit hospital, and second 
once a not-for-profit generates profits it is restricted in how those profits are distributed.  Both of 
these facts may make it easier to reach a collusive agreement in which the hospitals are 
essentially agreeing not to attempt to increase profits.   
There are many theories that suggest that the managers at not-for-profits may care less 
about profits, and are instead concerned with the provision of public goods, such as charity care 
and research (Weisbrod, 1988), or are concerned with providing high quality care (Hansmann, 
1996).  In those theories, hospital managers may not advertise because the increased profits that 
the advertising brings are not the core concern of those operating the organization.  The non-
distribution constraint also may create less of an incentive for management to increase profits, 
since there are no official owners to distribute the money. 
  Additionally, the managers at not-for-profits may simply feel that advertising, in its own 
right, is not an honorable activity.  This is consistent with the historical view of the AMA and the 
AHA.  Hospital managers may like profits, because they help the hospital provide all of the 
services they want to provide, but some methods of achieving that profitability are simply not 
worth the moral cost. 
  Finally, not-for-profit managers may enjoy spending their time on activities other than 
marketing and advertising.  Without the pressure to do all that is necessary to maximize profits, 
perhaps the managers would simply prefer to use their time to do other things – i.e. focus on 
medical services, research, etc.  Whichever reason was the principle reason behind the historically 
low level of advertising among hospitals prior to the 1990’s, something has occurred to change 
the reality in the healthcare marketplace. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 American Medical Association, Ethical Opinions, E-5.02, Advertising and Publicity. 
  4Theories of Advertising Changes 
 
  There are several possible explanations for the current rise in hospital advertising.  The 
first possibility is the unraveling from one equilibrium – where few hospitals advertise – to 
another – where many hospitals advertise.  Perhaps all hospitals, particularly the large teaching 
hospitals, would do little advertising as long as all of the other hospitals follow suit.  Once that 
equilibrium begins to unravel, it will unravel quickly, hence the rapid increase in advertising.   
Another hypothesis may be that the not-for-profit hospitals have undergone a 
fundamental change in their objectives.  One explanation as to why hospitals have historically 
done so little advertising, as we indicated above, is that marketing is unbecoming for a not-for-
profit institution – hence the statement in the code of ethics.  The corollary to that idea is that 
marketing is a perfectly acceptable activity for an organization concerned with profits.  Perhaps 
advertising is increasing because for-profit hospitals and their ethics are becoming more dominant 
in today’s hospital market.  This hypothesis leads to two predictions.  First, for-profit hospitals 
should advertise more than not-for-profits, and second, that advertising should increase more 
rapidly for not-for-profit hospitals that have more contact with for-profit competitors. 
Another explanation is that hospitals and their executives are more willing to engage in 
activities, such as advertising, that were once shunned because the new financial realities in 
health care have made them necessary.  If the financial strains become large enough, the choice 
for the hospital can be to stay open and advertise, or not to advertise and close or curtail valued 
activities.  The financial situation for hospitals has gradually deteriorated through the 1980s and 
1990s as reimbursements from government and private payers have decreased.  In addition to 
price reductions, hospitals have experienced a steady decline in admissions and inpatient days.  
This decline has been caused by both technological improvements that render some inpatient 
procedures obsolete (cataract surgery) or have greatly reduced the length of stay for other 
procedures.  In addition, hospitals have faced pressures form managed care organizations to 
  5reduce lengths of stay.  The result has been that inpatient days in U.S. hospitals have fallen by 
roughly 35% over the last twenty years.
6 
A final hypothesis is that changes in the market structure and the manner in which 
hospital reimbursements are determined have resulted in an increased return to advertising.  
Perhaps the return to hospital advertising had historically been very low, and the hospital 
executives chose not to advertise because they had little to gain.  If the marketplace changes such 
that there are significant gains to be had by advertising, then hospital managers will begin to 
advertise. 
One major change in the health care market structure over the last twenty years has been 
the rise of managed care.  In 1998, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) provided health 
insurance to roughly 30% of the U.S. marketplace.
7  Only 4 years earlier, that percentage had 
been less than 20%.  Twenty years ago, that percentage was essentially zero.  HMOs reduce 
health care costs, at least in part, by negotiating lower reimbursement rates with providers.  They 
achieve leverage in those negotiations by only offering a subset of a market’s providers in their 
ultimate network.  It is the threat to leave a provider out of the network that provides HMOs with 
their power. 
In a market with managed care organizations, advertising can potentially provide 
leverage to the providers.  To the extent that providers can render themselves indispensable in the 
eyes of the patients, then the threat for managed care companies to leave them out of the networks 
is much more empty.  In the extreme, if an insurer has very little chance of being able to sell a 
product that lacks one key hospital, then that hospital has all of the power in setting the 
reimbursement fees.  Advertising direct to patients may be a tool for the hospitals in creating this 
sense of necessity.  To the extent that advertising plays this new role in the negotiation process 
                                                           
6 American Hospital Association, Annual Survey of Hospitals 
7 Interstudy 
  6between hospitals and managed care, then the rise of managed care has increased the returns to 
advertising. 
In the sections that follow, I test several of the hypotheses outlined above.  Given the 
large variation across hospitals and hospital markets, it is possible to test each of the hypotheses 
empirically.  The change in objective function hypothesis can be tested using variation across 
markets in the influence of for-profit hospitals.  In particular, those markets that have experienced 
the greatest increase in for-profit influence should experience the greatest impact on the 
objectives of the other hospitals in the market. 
 
• Change in Objective Function Hypothesis:  Not-for-profit hospitals with more 
and increasing contact with for-profit hospitals will advertise more. 
 
 
The financial distress hypothesis can be tested using variation in financial performance 
across hospitals, and with differences in market structure changes across markets.  Theoretically, 
if the financial distress story is driving the change in hospital advertising, then hospitals that 
experience more financial distress should advertise more.  The alternative story is that hospitals 
with less money will do less of everything, including advertising. 
 
• Financial Distress Hypothesis:  Hospitals in financial distress will respond by 
increasing advertising expenditures 
 
 
The penetration of HMOs into markets is a form of financial distress for hospitals.  This 
means that the relationship between HMO penetration and hospital advertising will combine two 
effects: the effect of financial distress and the effect of HMO presence on the returns to 
advertising.  Empirically, it is possible to disentangle these two effects if the returns to 
advertising do not change universally for all hospitals. 
In the returns to advertising hypothesis, advertising by hospitals would focus on hospital 
quality, in order to create the sense of necessity among the patients.  Some hospitals, particularly 
those that are large or are teaching hospitals, may be more credible in their advertising than 
  7others.  Those hospitals for which their high-quality claims are more believable should increase 
their ad spending more than those hospitals for which their claims are less credible.  The 
empirical test is then whether hospitals that are more likely to be credible (teaching and large 
hospitals) increase their advertising by more in response to HMO penetration than other hospitals. 
 
• Increased Returns to Advertising Hypothesis:  More credible hospitals in 




 I will not focus directly on the initial hypothesis – that the increase in advertising is due 
to an equilibrium shift from no advertising to everyone advertising.  If none of the other 
hypotheses were to be supported in the data, then the cascading equilibrium theory could be the 
explanation.  Even if the other hypotheses prove to have some validity, it is impossible to prove 
that some form of equilibrium cascade did not occur.  For instance, in the data, it appears that 
large teaching hospitals responded to increased HMO penetration by increasing ad spending.  
That provides support to the increasing returns hypothesis, and it may also be true that once some 
teaching hospitals decided to advertise, many others decided to follow.  More generally, it may be 
that any of the other hypotheses can act as triggers in creating a cascade from one equilibrium to 
another.  Additionally, if not-for-profit hospitals were not advertising before because their lack of 
concern for profits made collusion easier, then any change (in objective function, financial 
distress, increased pressure from insurers) that would increase their concern for profits could lead 




  The data we employ in this paper comes from four sources: the American Hospital 
Association (AHA), the Medicare Cost Reports, Interstudy, and VoiceTrak.  Each source 
provides a panel of data across U.S. hospitals from 1995-1998.  The AHA data contains 
  8information on hospital ownership, size and location.  The AHA data is also used to generate data 
characterizing a hospital’s market, including information on the number of competitors.  The 
Medicare data contains financial information for the hospitals, including revenues, expenses and 
income numbers.  The Interstudy data provides the data on HMO penetration over time at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. 
  VoiceTrak is the source for the hospital advertising data.  VoiceTrak surveys roughly 
11,000 media outlets each year, achieving a response rate of over 85% by offering the 
respondents some of the survey results.  VoiceTrak surveys radio, print and TV outlets and 
compiles an annual advertising spending number for each firm, including hospitals.  The 
VoiceTrak data was merged with the other data sources to create a panel of roughly 5,000 
hospitals over four years.  Any advertising expenditures attributed to hospital holding companies 
or hospital networks were distributed among the member hospitals in the market according to size 
to the amount possible.  The network and affiliation data in the AHA is far from complete.  To 
the extent that some expenditures are not distributed, that should dampen the advertising numbers 




  The first hypothesis as to why hospital advertising has increased in recent years is that the 
objectives of the hospitals have changed.  In order to test this, we first examine whether hospitals 
of different ownership types in fact exhibit different behavior with respect to marketing.  If the 
difference in advertising expenditures is caused by differences in objectives, then that is 
presumably driven by not-for-profits having an objective function that differs from profit 
maximization.  Most of the differences that would be proposed, such as ethical concerns, should 
lead to not-for-profits advertising less than for-profits.  If the objectives of the hospitals are 
changing, then not-for-profits should behave more like for-profits through time. 
  9  Table 1 presents results of a simple least-squares regression to illustrate the average 
advertising behavior by hospital types.  The following regression is estimated: 
 
(1)  t h t h t h t h t t h Teach Pub FP Beds AdSpending , , , , 1 , * ε β γ α + + + + + + =  
 
The regression includes the VoiceTrak advertising expenditures as the dependent 
variable.  The number of hospital beds as well as dummy variables indicating hospital ownership 
type are included on the right hand side.   
The results help illustrate that the general pattern is not entirely consistent with the 
change in objectives hypothesis.  If the hypothesis is correct, for-profits should advertise more 
than not-for-profits, but the relationship should narrow over this period of time while advertising 
spending is increasing so rapidly.  In the regressions, the omitted hospital category is non-
teaching, not-for-profit hospitals.  The regression in column 1 shows that over the whole time 
period, for-profits do advertise more than not-for-profit, non-teaching hospitals and public 
hospitals, but less than teaching hospitals.  The difference between for-profits and non-teaching 
not-for-profits is not significant at standard levels of significance.   
The regression in column 2 presents results with each hospital type interacted with the 
year effects.  These results highlight the regime shift in hospital advertising that was evident in 
figure 3.  By the end of the period, for-profit hospitals advertise significantly less than all not-for-
profit hospitals, and the teaching hospitals have increased their advertising expenditures 
significantly. 
Again, this result is a little too strong for the change in objectives hypothesis, since the 
not-for-profits not only begin to advertise as much as the for-profits, but even surpass them.  It is 
possible that a change in objectives could still be a driver behind the rise in advertising if it were 
true that the returns to advertising are higher for the not-for-profits and the teaching hospitals, in 
  10particular.  Then once all hospitals are comfortable advertising, the not-for-profits would actually 
do more, not just the same amount. 
  Another test of the change in objectives hypothesis is to see whether hospitals that 
interact more with for-profit hospitals advertise more.  The assumption behind this theory is that 
not-for-profit hospitals have historically had an ethic of not advertising, while for-profit hospitals 
have not felt restricted with respect to marketing.  As not-for-profit hospitals increasingly interact 
with for-profits, they may begin to absorb some of their behaviors.  In table 2, the following 
fixed-effects regression is estimated: 
 
(2)  t h t h t h t h t h X FPMktShare AdSpending , , 2 , 1 , * * ε β β γ α + + + + =  
 
  Again, the advertising expenditures are the dependent variable.  Year and hospital fixed 
effects are included on the right hand side along with other hospital and market characteristics 
including; ownership status (for-profit, public, religious), teaching status, hospital occupancy rate, 
net income, and whether the hospital is a local monopoly (no other hospital within ten miles).  
The key variable of interest is the percentage of hospital beds in the hospital’s ten-mile market 
that are in for-profit hospitals – the for-profit market share.  This variable, as well as interactions 
of this variable with the various ownership types, are included in the regression.  The hypothesis 
is that as a hospital is increasingly interacting with for-profit hospitals, the more likely that 
hospital is to begin behaving as a for-profit. 
  The results are presented in table 2.  The only difference between columns 1 and 2 is that 
teaching status is not included in the first regression.  The coefficient on for-profit market share, 
86,845, represents the impact of increased for-profit market share on the omitted category, non-
teaching, not-for-profit hospitals.  This coefficient is marginally significant and positive, but the 
magnitude is small relative to the overall change in advertising.  The result suggests that an 
  11increase in for-profit market share of 10% leads to an increase in advertising of $8,600.  The 
average change across hospitals in for-profit market share from 1994-1998 is less than 1%.  The 
standard deviation is 15%, so there were some hospitals that experienced a significant increase in 
for-profit influence.  The effect for teaching hospitals is essentially zero.  Since the largest 
increase in hospital advertising over this time period has been from large, teaching hospitals, the 
impact of for-profit hospitals does little to explain the general trend. 
  The coefficients on net income and occupancy rate are not significantly different from 
zero.  This is the first test of the financial distress hypothesis.  The regressions in table 2 provide 
no evidence that tougher financial conditions lead to an increase in advertising. 
  Table 3 presents results on the relationship between HMO penetration and hospital 
advertising.  These results provide insight into both the financial distress and change in returns to 
advertising hypotheses.  At one level, an increase in HMO penetration is a negative financial 
shock to hospitals.  This may affect advertising in either direction.  The financial distress 
hypothesis suggests that the rise in advertising may be due to increasing financial strain on 
hospitals.  Alternatively, a strain on hospital budgets may require a decrease in all types of 
spending, including advertising.  At another level, the presence of HMOs in the market may 
increase the returns to advertising.  This affect may differ across hospitals, as some hospitals may 
have more credibility in their claims of high quality.  The regressions in table 3 estimate the 
following regression: 
 
(3) t h t msa t h t h t h t h t h t h t h HMO L T L T FP AdSpend , , 5 , , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , * * * * ε β β β β β γ α + + + + + + + =  
 
  As with equation 2, the regression includes hospital and year fixed effects, as well as 
controls for hospital type (T – teaching hospital, L – more than 200 beds) and the HMO 
  12penetration at the MSA level.  The regression in column 2 contains interaction terms between 
HMO penetration and the for-profit, teaching, large, and large teaching variables. 
  The coefficient on the HMO penetration variable is the result of interest.  Without the 
interaction terms (column 1), there is no significant relationship between HMO penetration and 
hospital advertising.  The coefficient is positive, but not significant at normal levels.  Once the 
interactions are included, an interesting pattern is revealed.  The omitted group – non-teaching 
not-for-profit hospitals – responds to increased HMO penetration by advertising less.  Every 10% 
increase in HMO penetration leads to $8,800 less in advertising.  For-profit hospitals also respond 
to increased advertising with less advertising, not more as either the financial distress or the 
increased returns hypotheses would suggest.  Increased financial distress appears to lead to less 
spending on advertising for small and for-profit hospitals. 
The final groups – teaching and big hospitals – provide evidence consistent with the 
increased returns to advertising theory.  Both teaching hospital and large hospitals respond to 
increased HMO penetration with additional advertising.  The effect for a large, non-teaching 
hospital is not significantly different from zero, although the effect is no longer negative like the 
previous groups.  For large, teaching hospitals the effect of HMO penetration on advertising is 
significant and large.  Each increase in HMO penetration of 10% leads to an increase in hospital 
advertising of $43,000.  Among large, teaching hospitals, the average change in HMO penetration 
from 1995-1998 was 8% with a standard deviation of 14%.  On average, this category of hospitals 
increased its advertising spending by $150,000.  The increased influence of managed care appears 




  The rise of hospital advertising in the late 1990s is best characterized by the significant 
increase in marketing activity by large, not-for-profit teaching hospitals.  There is little evidence 
  13to suggest that any increased influence of for-profit hospitals explains the recent pattern in 
marketing behavior.  Over this time period, for-profit hospitals have actually decreased their 
marketing expenditures.  Non-teaching, not-for-profit hospitals that were exposed to more for-
profit competition increased their ad expenditures in a marginally significant manner, but the 
magnitude of the effect is small. 
  Changes in managed care penetration are positively correlated with increased advertising, 
but only for the teaching hospitals, and particularly for large, teaching hospitals.  For all other 
hospitals, increased managed care reduces ad spending, suggesting that HMOs represent a 
financial shock to hospitals.  For the large, teaching hospitals, the results with respect to HMOs 
suggest support for the increased return to advertising hypothesis.  The presence of HMOs in the 
marketplace introduces a new negotiating dynamic, in which hospitals can attain higher 
reimbursement fees if they can dampen the HMOs’ abilities to threaten to leave them out of 
insurance contracts.  Advertising direct to patients, if effective, can perhaps help to create a sense 
of necessity for a hospital.  Only hospitals for which their quality claims will be credible (large, 
teaching hospitals) will gain through this type of advertising.  For all the other hospitals, HMOs 
are simply a financial shock, and advertising expenditures should fall. 
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  18Dependent Variable:  Real Hospital Advertising Expenditures
(1) (2)





  1996 9,124.9
(1.88)
  1997 -4,346.1
-(0.74)





  1996 -9,837.8
-(3.24)
  1997 -19,751.6
-(4.90)
  1998 -20,281.1
-(4.40)
Teaching Hospital 48,183.4 -11,692.0
(5.63) -(1.29)
Year Interactions
  1996 45,116.2
(5.85)
  1997 98,315.0
(8.19)
  1998 103,087.4
(8.36)
Year Effects
  1996 20,116.7 13,078.6
(11.66) (6.14)
  1997 35,103.3 22,408.0
(13.07) (7.89)




# Observations 19,539 19,539
R Squared 0.21 0.22
Table 1: Relationships of Hospital Types To Hospital Advertising









Hospital Beds 77.72 78.11
(0.75) (0.75)
FP Market Share in 10-Mile Market 86,845.62 78,777.74
(1.88) (1.75)
Interactions
   FP Market Share * For-Profit -101,889.95 -94,168.86
-(1.58) -(1.50)
   FP Market Share * Public -62,834.33 -62,119.12
-(1.11) -(1.10)
   FP Market Share * Religious -72,150.87 28,076.80
-(0.69) (0.85)
   FP Market Share * Teach -70,884.33
-(0.67)
Monopoly in 10-Mile Market 5,988.82 6,699.86
(0.41) (0.46)
Occupancy Rate -7,985.25 -7,995.76
-(0.65) -0.65
Net Income 0.00 0.00
-(1.02) -(1.02)
Year Effects
  1996 19,526.48 19,441.07
(9.29) (9.26)
  1997 33,367.15 33,309.83
(10.46) (10.41)




Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes
# Observations 15,791 15,791
R Squared 0.78 0.78
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by hospital
Table 2: Advertising and For-Profit Market Share
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Hospital Beds 129.97 145.43
(1.21) (1.38)
HMO Penetration at MSA Level 52,735.47 -88,180.58
(1.66) -(2.94)
HMO Penetration Interactions
  For-Profit -92,630.49
-(1.69)
  Teach 249,337.49
(3.72)
  Hospital Beds>200 104,938.15
(1.75)






Hospital Beds > 200 8,537.69 -40,640.50
(0.53) -(1.85)
Year Effects
  1995 -54,556.12 -55,111.42
-(8.77) -(8.69)
  1996 -20,026.40 -20,373.52
-(3.60) -(3.63)




Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes
# Observations 10,387 10,387
R-Squared 0.76 0.77
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by hospital
Table 3: Advertising and HMO Penetration
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